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"OUR MOST SACRED LEGAL COMMITMENTS":
A DIGITAL EXPLORATION OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
DEFINING WHO WE ARE AND HOw THEY SHOULD OPINE
Eric C. Nystrom and David S. Tanenhaus1
The whole part, the whole point, the whole function, the whole duty of the
Supreme Court is to teach. To give reasons for what we do. You could learn
a lot. On the other hand we teach by keeping the press out. We teach that
we are judged by what we write. We don't go around giving press
conferences "how great my decision was" or "how bad the dissent was."
We are judged by what we write.
-Justice Anthony Kennedy, 20132
Legal commentators have described the 6-3 decision in Korematsu v.
United States (1944) as one of the worst decisions in the U.S. Supreme
Court's history.3 The Roberts Court, in fact, recently held that "Korematsu
was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court
of history, and-to be clear-'has no place in law under the
Constitution'."4 The Court's language in Korematsu, however, is still
1. Eric C. Nystrom is Associate Professor of History at Arizona State University and can be
reached at eric.nystrom@asu.edu. David S. Tanenhaus is James E. Rogers Professor of History and Law,
holding a joint appointment in the William S. Boyd School of Law and the Department of History at the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. He can be reached at david.tanenhaus@unlv.edu. First, they thank the
organizers and participants from the 2018 West Coast Rhetoric Workshop, who provided invaluable
feedback on this project during its formative stage: Cindy Archer, Ian Bartrum, Mary Beth Beazley, Linda
Berger, Stewart Chang, Ken Chestak, Tom Cobb, Leslie Culver, Kirsten Davis, Linda Edwards, Joan
Howarth, Brian Larson, Terry Pollman, Jeanne Price, Rebecca Scharf, Todd Stafford, and David Ziff. We
also thank the Library Innovation Lab and Caselaw Access Project team at Harvard Law School,
especially Jack Cushman, Kelly Fitzpatrick, Adam Ziegler, and Jonathan Zittrain, and the organizers and
participants of the Caselaw Access Project Research Summit in June 2019. Special thanks to Associate
Dean for Faculty Development and Research Ian Bartrum, who invited us to present the penultimate draft
of this article to the William S. Boyd faculty in September, 2020. The following readers also helped us
along the path to publication: Peter Bayer, Winston Bowman, A. Christopher Bryant, Stephen Carradini,
Michael Green, Maximo Langer, and Addie Rolnick. We also thank Dean Dan Hamilton of the William
S. Boyd School of Law for his unstinting support of our digital legal history projects that include this
article. That support, in this case, allowed us to complete this project during the pandemic and to hire
Kelsey DeLozier to help us prepare the manuscript for submission. Finally, we thank Corey Bushle, Evan
Gildenblatt, Greg Margarian, Madeline de Gouvea Pinto, and Hunter Poindexter of the University of
Cincinnati Law Review for editing and publishing our article.
2. Andrew Cohen, The (Almost) Lost Speech of Justice Anthony Kennedy, THE ATLANTIC (July
31, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/the-almost-lost-speech-of-justice-
anthony-kennedy/278094/.
3. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Scott Bombay, The Supreme Court 'Worst
Decision' Lives on in the 2016 Campaign, CONST. DAILY (Dec. 18, 2015),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-supreme-courts-worst-decision-lives-on-in-2016-campaign.
4. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) at 2423; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J.,
dissenting.)
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worth investigating because it illuminates how the justices incorporate
ideas about who "we" are into their decision-making, while
simultaneously raising legal-historical questions about whether this
practice has changed over time.5
"Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving
the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of
racial prejudice," announced Justice Hugo Black for the U.S. Supreme
Court in Korematsu.6 Black argued, however, that the justices' task was
not so simple. "To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without
reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely
confuses the issue," he explained.7 Justice Black continued:
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to
him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese
Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an
invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security
measures, because they decided that he military urgency of the situation
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the
West Coast temporarily, and, finally, because Congress, reposing its
confidence in this time of war in our military leaders-as inevitably it
must-determined that they should have the power to do just this. There
was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities
considered that he need for action was great, and time was short. We
cannot-by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight-now
say that, at that time, these actions were unjustified.8
Not only did Justice Black repeatedly use "our" as a possessive noun,
an adjective, and a reflexive pronoun, but the famous dissents in
Korematsu by Justices Robert Jackson a d Frank Murphy also used the
word repeatedly. For example, Jackson began his opinion with the
assertion that "Korematsu was born on our soil, of parents born in
Japan."9 This simple sentence, of course, rested on an uneasy national
5. There is a substantial literature about legal language cr ating and destroying shared cultural
meanings. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term--Forward: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983). (For a good example of how the justices build historical assumptions into
their decisions); See also ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2019) (Foner examines how the justices' understanding
of Reconstruction has shaped their interpretations of the Constitution from the late nineteenth century to
the present.).
6. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223 (emphasis added). Justice Black also wrote the Court's unanimous
decision in an earlier Korematsu about whether the District Court's order of probation, without having
imposed a sentence, was a reviewable, final decision. Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943).
Black's opinion, which concluded with the statement "Our answer to the question is Yes," set the stage
for the Court to issue its more famous Korematsu decision the next year. Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
7. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
8. Id. at 223-24 (emphasis added).
9. Id.at 242 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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history about birthright citizenship, immigration, and periodic ugly
debates about who is an American.1 0 Jackson also cautioned that the
principle of Korematsu "then lies about like a loaded weapon, ready for
the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an
urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our
law and thinking and expands it to new purposes."11 Justice Murphy
contended that "Racial discrimination in any form and in any degree has
no justifiable part whatever in our democratic way of life."12 He added:
To give constitutional sanction to that inference in this case, however well-
intentioned may have been the military command on the Pacific Coast, is
to adopt one of the cruelest of the rationales used by our enemies to destroy
the dignity of the individual and to encourage and open the door to
discriminatory actions against other minority groups in the passions of
tomorrow.13
As Risa Goluboff has shown in The Lost Promise of Civil Rights,
during the late 1930s and 1940s legal thinkers and litigators were
struggling to define what the term "civil rights" meant. 14 Cases such as
United States v. Gaskin (1944) and Korematsu provided opportunities for
the Supreme Court during wartime to reconsider constitutional claims
about oppressive racial and economic systems of power that trapped
African Americans in peonage in the rural South and left Japanese
Americans such as Fred Korematsu imprisoned in horse stalls in the
American West.15 The above quotations from the justices' opinions in
Korematsu dramatically illustrate the rhetorical power of the word "our"
to define "who" the justices think "we" are and how "they" should act.
But is Korematsu representative of how the justices have used "our" from
the launching of the New Republic to the present? Is the usage in
Korematsu the product of a particularly fraught historical moment, or
have justices used the word similarly since the founding era?
"Our" is a slippery word, and its slipperiness is one element of the
appeal of attempting to measure its use. In a judicial opinion, "our" can
mean very different things. For example, in Chisholm v. Georgia, the first
time in American history that the justices extensively relied on the word
10. For good introductions to these interconnected histories, ee MARTHA JONES, BIRTHRIGHT
CITIZENS: A HISTORY OF RACE AND RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (2018); KATHERINE BENTON-
COHEN, INVENTING THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM: THE DILLINGHAM COMMISSION AND ITS LEGACY
(2018); MARK BRILLIANT, THE COLOR OF AMERICA HAS CHANGED: How RACIAL DIVERSITY SHAPED
CIVIL RIGHTS REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, 1941-1978 (2010).
11. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
14. RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007).
15. Id.; United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527 (1944).
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"our," they used it thirty-one times and in two distinct ways.16 The case
raised the question of whether a private citizen could sue a state in federal
court.17 Georgia, the state in question, had asserted sovereign immunity
and the litigation raised fundamental questions about the status of states
under the new constitutional system.18 By four votes to one, the justices
rejected Georgia's argument about sovereign immunity and instead held
that Article III, Section II of the Constitution provided federal courts the
affirmative power to hear disputes between private citizens and the
states.19
First, Justice James Iredell, the lone dissenter, used "our" seven times
to describe how the judicial process should guide the Court's approach.
This included statements about "our duty," "our giving judgment," "our
directions," and "our jurisdiction."20 Iredell's court-centered, self-aware
linguistic mode explicitly connected the Court's ongoing existence, rules,
and policies to its present and future work.2 1 Over time, the Court has built
on this "judicial process" usage that includes using "our" to describe the
Court's precedents, procedures, and practices.22 For example, the justices
have used the phrase "our decision" more than 5,300 times and referred
to "our opinion" more than 3,000 times.23
Second, Justice James Wilson repeatedly used "our" to claim, create,
and contest what we call "cultural markers" that could anchor the Court's
decision-making.24 Before becoming a justice, Wilson had signed the
Declaration of Independence, helped draft the proposed Constitution, and
led the fight for its ratification in Pennsylvania. In his Chisholm opinion,
he included several Iredell-like examples of judicial process.
Significantly, Wilson also repeatedly used "our" to connect the American
experience to the wider world. For example, he initially used "our" to
frame his analysis of the case in terms of the "law of nations."25 As he
explained, "By that law, the several States and Governments spread over
our globe are considered as forming a society, not a NATION." 2 6 He then
16. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
17. Id. at 429-30.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 464-66, 476-79.
20. Id. at 429, 429, 433, 434.
21. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 429-34 (1793).
22. Our description of the procedural usage of our is similar to David A. Straus's argument about
the Supreme Court's common-law approach to constitutional interpretation. The justices are consciously
thinking about their decisions as part of a longstanding tradition. See DAVID A. STRAUs, THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION (2010).
23. Eric C. Nystrom & David S. Tanenhaus, Usages of 'our' by U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 1791-
2011, ZENODO (Nov. 18, 2020), https://zenodo.org/record/4743965.
24. See infra Section 111.
25. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 431.
26. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
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used "our" to emphasize what was new about the American experiment
in governance, when he invoked "our union."27
Wilson also used "our" to critique the assumption that "the states,"
rather than "the people," had created the United States. As he explained:
Sentiments and expressions of this inaccurate kind prevail in our common,
even in our convivial, language. Is a toast asked? "The United States,"
instead of the "People of the United States," is the toast given. This is not
politically correct. The toast is meant to present to view the first great
object in the Union: It presents only the second. It presents only the
artificial person, instead of the natural persons, who spoke it into existence.
A State I cheerfully admit, is the noblest work of Man: But, Man himself,
free and honest, is, I speak as to this world, the noblest work of GOD.28
In this instance, Wilson was using his judicial opinion to try and correct
a public misconception about the recent past that had tremendous
consequences for constitutional interpretation.
Wilson also used "our" to remind his audience where "they" came from
and who "they" were:
On the mention of Athens, a thousand refined and endearing associations
rush at once into the memory of the scholar, the philosopher, and the
patriot. When Homer, one of the most correct, as well as the oldest of
human authorities, enumerates the other nations of Greece whose forces
acted at the siege of Troy, he arranges them under the names of their
different Kings or Princes. But when he comes to the Athenians, he
distinguishes them by the peculiar appellation of the PEOPLE of Athens.
The well known address used by Demosthenes, when he harrangued and
animated his assembled countrymen, was "O Men of Athens." With the
strictest propriety, therefore, classical and political, our national scene
opens with the most magnificent object which the nation could present.
"The PEOPLE of the United States" are the first personages introduced.
Who were those people?29
As these multiple examples from Wilson's opinion demonstrate, "our"
could help a justice to connect the United States to the wider world, while
simultaneously emphasizing the new nation's unique system of
government. A justice could also use "our" to correct the historical record.
Much like Iredell's "process" usage anticipated the language of later
justices, so have Wilson's "cultural" usages. Since Chisholm, for
example, the Court has referred to "our society" more than 840 times.30
27. Id. at 455.
28. Id. at 462-63 (emphasis added). For the significance of toasting in the New Republic, see
DAVID WALDSTREICHER, IN THE MIDST OF PERPETUAL FETES: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
NATIONALISM 1776-1820 (1997).
29. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 463 (emphasis added).
30. Supra note 23.
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This includes Justice Alito's recent dissent in Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga.,
in which he noted, "For most 21st-century Americans, it is painful to be
reminded of the way our society once treated gays and lesbians, but any
honest effort to understand what the terms of Title VII were understood
to mean when they were enacted must take that into account the societal
norms of that time."31
During the early 1790s, we should note, every justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States wrote his own opinion about the case or
controversy at issue. Later, under the commanding leadership of Chief
Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court abandoned the practice of seriatim
opinions.3 2 Moreover, as the Supreme Court itself later noted in
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi (1934), their Chisholm decision had
"created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at
once proposed and adopted."33 This swift repudiation of the Supreme
Court's decision by Congress and the States is a reminder of how fluid
American constitutionalism was during the 1790s before the idea of the
constitution itself became "fixed" by the decade's end .34
This Article focuses on uncovering the multiple meanings of the word
"our" in the published opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court from Chisholm
to modern times. To do so, we use a digital legal history approach,
combining robust court data, text mining techniques, and expert word
classification, using a set of custom open-source tools and open data.35
Section I discusses the Court, our sources, and our "our" sources.
Tracking the usage of this word in the published opinions of the Court,
we see that, like any word, its use changes over time, rising and falling
both as part of broader linguistic uses and specific moments in the
Supreme Court's history. This Article examines how this language
reflected changes in the court's concerns over different periods of its
history. This discussion then forms a framework and context for the next
31. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1769 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
32. Ronald D. Rotunda, "The Fall of Seriatim Opinions and the Rise of the Supreme Court,"
Verdict: Legal Analysis from Justia, October 9, 2017, https://verdict.justia.com/, accessed on May 7,
2021.
33. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934).
34. JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING
ERA (2018).
35. See Kellen Funk & Lincoln A. Mullen, The Spine of American Law: Digital Text Analysis and
U.S. Legal Practice, 123 AM. HIST. REv. 132 (2018); Stephen Robertson, Searching forAnglo-American
Digital Legal History, 34 L. HIST. REV. 1047 (2016); Eric C. Nystrom & David S. Tanenhaus, The Future
of Digital Legal History: No Magic, No Silver Bullets, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 150 (2016); Charles W.
Romney, Using Vector Space Models to Understand the Circulation of Habeas Corpus in Hawai'i, 1852-
1892, 34 L. HIST. REv. 999 (2016). For a good introduction to computational legal analysis, see MICHAEL
A. LIVEMORE, LAW AS DATA: COMPUTATION, TEXT AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL ANALYSIS (Daniel N.
Rockmore ed., 2019).
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two Sections.
Section II proceeds to tie together the linguistic data from Court
opinions with a broader data set, which enables us to set the patterns of
"our" cases in the context of the Court's work over time. Do these cases
stand out in some fashion, or do they fit the broader patterns of the Court's
ordinary operation? Here, we examine the cases from a number of
angles-from the patterns of use under particular Chief Justices, to the
habits of individual justices when they wrote majority opinions. Section
II also looks at the legal areas and types of law, as well as voting
coalitions, to gradually refine our understanding of the contexts in which
"our" seems to be employed most by the Court.
Section III delves further into two broad categories of "judicial
process" and "culture-constituting" uses that emerge from a close look at
the uses of "our" and its surrounding words. We also examine a third
category of indistinct, ambiguous, or other uses. Do certain uses occur
over time in the same proportions, and at the same time periods, as all the
others, or do they wax and wane in different cycles? Do particular justices
deploy this language more frequently than others, or does it appear more
commonly in particular types of law to the exclusion of others? We map
keywords associated with the appearance of "our" in opinions to these
broad categories, using the keywords as markers of these broad concepts.
We then look at the process-oriented uses of "our" from a distance, to see
if particular types of cases appear to use this language more than others.
Section IV closely examines those cases of "our" where the
surrounding words are markers of a concern not with precedent or judicial
reasoning, but the shared values, practices, and culture that collectively
constituted the American body politic. Moving from this broad, data-
driven view, we then closely examine two landmark cases, Furman v.
Georgia (1972) and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer
(1952), from two different periods we identified, that represented the
culture-constituting use of "our" by the Supreme Court.
In our Conclusion, we return to our initial question: How representative
is Korematsu? Answering that question-which requires understanding
the use of the word "our" over time and in specific historical contexts
provides a fresh perspective for interpreting Supreme Court decisions,
whether an early decision such as Chisholm or a contemporary one like
Bostock. The Article closes by examining how Justice Sonia Sotomayor
incorporates new voices into constitutional interpretation to reconsider
our history and the Court's role in shaping our future.
I. OUR "OUR" SOURCES
We begin with the published words of the United States Supreme
838 [VOL. 89
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Court. As the highest court in the United States system of justice, its
opinions invariably set precedent. Further, since the early days of the
nation, Supreme Court justices have incorporated, to varying degrees in
individual cases, a range of social and cultural understandings about the
purpose of the law, the appropriate ways law should function, the duties
of citizen and state to one another, and the best balance between timeless
values and present-day social concerns.36 The Court's decisions directly
shape the law that governs Americans. While the U.S. Supreme Court
might not be the only institution whose formal utterances can be
understood as both reflective of and constitutive of American society at a
particular time, it is undoubtedly important enough to examine.
Studying the Supreme Court also has some important practical
advantages. The published opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court have all
been digitized, making it seemingly straightforward to construct a
coherent and inclusive corpus. Comprehensive, consistent, and generally
excellent metadata bout each case, including opinion author and the vote
of each justice, has been created and made freely available.37 The total
number of substantive opinions-fewer than 40,000 in the Court's entire
history38 -comprise an easily manageable universe in an era of "big
data." With these resources, it is possible to confidently know quite a lot
about the Court's words and actions.
We began by downloading the full text of the Court's published
opinions. We would have preferred to use the texts of Supreme Court
opinions that were recently made available to much fanfare by the Law
Library of Congress, which were painstakingly hand-corrected by fifty
36. Classic historical studies of how Supreme Court justices contemplated their role and the impact
of social and cultural factors on their decision-making include G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL
COURT & CULTURAL CHANGE: 1815-1835 (1991) MORTON J. HORWITz, THE WARREN COURT AND THE
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1999); and MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
37. Harold J. Spaeth et al., 2019 Supreme Court Database,, WASH. U. L.: THE SUPREME COURT
DATABASE, http://supremecourtdatabase.org/data.php?s=2 (last visited Dec. 6, 2019).
38. As of December 6, 2019, Courtlistener includes 63,823 opinions in its U.S. Supreme Court
dataset, but there are a number of duplicates. Opinions, COURT LISTENER,
https://www.courtlistener.com/?type=o&q=&type=o&orderby=score+desc&stat_Precedential=on&cou
rt=scotus (last visited Mar. 4, 2021). The Library of Congress notes 35,578 items in its United States
Reports collection. Collection Items, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/collections/united-
states-reports/ which covers through volume 542 (last visited Mar. 4, 2021). The Supreme Court Database
(SCDB) includes 19,861 opinions in its "Legacy" data (v. 05) and 8,966 in its modern (2019-01) data, for
a total of 28,827, but this total excludes a number of published decisions of smaller import, as noted below.
CAP (data version Sept. 27, 2019) includes all opinions, including per curiam ones omitted by SCDB.
They list 341,083 entries for the highest court, though it seems likely that this contains ome errors. Within
this data, 33,213 case citations appear once and only once, which might be considered a rough proxy
measure for the substantive decisions recorded by SCDB, because multiple per curiam opinions are
usually grouped under the same reporter citation.
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volunteers.39 However, despite the public domain status of these
government documents, the Library of Congress has shortsightedly
decided, due to the origins of this project in an agreement with William
S. Hein & Co, Inc., to prohibit bulk downloading, making the type of
analysis we conduct here impossible.40 Despite these limitations, the
Library of Congress collection was useful for manual use in double-
checking the data we did use against scans of the original sources.
For the first iteration of our analysis, we used full-text opinions
provided by CourtListener.com. Indeed, an early version of this work was
presented based upon the CourtListener data, and many of our
conclusions in this early draft remain sound in light of our later data
practice.41 However, CourtListener's full-text data was not structured to
separate the majority opinion from any other dissenting or concurring
opinions, and we developed some concerns about the completeness of the
dataset. Given our hunt for changing language, these seemed like
important requirements.
We thus later turned to a new source of full-text data, the Caselaw
Access Project ("CAP"), which did separate distinct opinions. CAP data
is offered for bulk download to registered researchers as a set of JSON
files, each containing the full text and metadata from cases from a
particular jurisdiction (broadly conceived). JSON is a structured text
format which can be straightforwardly parsed using programming
libraries available in most languages.42
We decided to look for the word "our" across all Supreme Court
opinions and capture the context as well as other metadata describing each
occurrence. We created a program that performed several steps on each
opinion within each case, creating a spreadsheet of digested output that
can be used in later stages. Once the text was extracted, the program
removed unwanted non-alphabetic characters, converted it all to
39. Andrew Hamm, Law Library of Congress Digitally Releases U.S. Reports from 1791 to 2004,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 13, 2018, 4:34 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/03/law-library-congress-
digitally-releases-u-s-reports-1791-2004/; Press Release, Library of Congress, Historical Supreme Court
Cases Now Online (Mar. 13, 2018), available at https://www.loc.gov/item/prn-18-026/historical-
supreme-court-cases-now-online/2018-03-13/.
40. Rights and Access, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/collections/united-states-
reports/about-this-collection/rights-and-access/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2019); Jennifer Gonzalez, Historical
U.S. Reports Online, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Feb. 22, 2018),
https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2018/02/historical-u-s-reports-available-online/; confirmed via email, question
response #13896363, Sept. 26, 2018.
41. The toolkit we developed to work with CourtListener data is: Eric C. Nystrom, cl-tools: Legal
History Toolkit to Work with CourtListener Data, GITHUB (Oct. 31, 2018),
https://github.com/ericnystrom/cl-tools (providing software). It is written in Perl and makes use of
Lib::JSON and other Perl libraries.
42. The case data can also be accessed via n API, though we chose not to utilize it because of the
size of our requests.
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lowercase, then looped over the text, looking for each instance of a
specified keyword ("our") surrounded by word-boundary markers (such
as a space or punctuation character).43 The words immediately before and
after each matching keyword were saved for context, and a running count
was kept of the number of keyword matches in each opinion. Additional
data, such as case name, date, court name, citation, etc., was also captured
and printed as part of each output record. The data thus generated initially
served as the basis for a series of error checks.
We then turned to the venerable Supreme Court Database ("SCDB") to
give us additional metadata about each case.44 The SCDB contains a
subset of all U.S. Supreme Court opinions. The project's documentation
is somewhat unclear on what gets included-in one place, it notes that the
database includes "each case decided by the Court ,"45 and elsewhere
mentions that it contains every "argued case."46 In practice, the latter
seems to be a more accurate description of the SCDB team's procedure,
which generally leaves out cases where the Court took little action (such
as denial of certiorari).47
To use the SCDB metadata with the CAP full text of opinions, CAP
cases needed to be matched to the appropriate SCDB record. We
anticipated that a connection between CAP and SCDB data would be
valuable beyond just our present study, so we purposefully addressed
connecting every SCDB entry to its CAP equivalent, not just those in our
preliminary word search results. We approached this work in two stages.
First, we attempted to automatically match the records based on the U.S.
Reports citation included in each entry. Since SCDB contains fewer
records (because of exclusion of minor actions), we utilized the entire
SCDB dataset and then, for each SCDB record, searched for the U.S.
Reports citation in the CAP data. Ideally, we would find one, and only
one, matching CAP case. If we found more than one, we marked the
record as a "multiple" requiring further investigation. Similarly, if we did
43. Specifying word-boundary markers allowed us to avoid false positives on words containing a
keyword within them, such as "hours" or "pour." It also excluded "ours" and "ourselves," which would
not have made a substantial impact on the analysis techniques we used here, as those terms did not
typically have a following noun to categorize, but this may be a condition worth revisiting if future
analysis uses more sophisticated techniques.
44. Spaeth, supra note 37. For details about loading this data, including variable labels, into a SQL
database for use, see Eric Nystrom, Supreme Court Database for the SQL-minded, (Dec. 6, 2019),
http://ericnystrom.org/posts/SupremeCourtDatabasefortheSQL-minded/.
45. Homepage, WASH. U. L.: THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/ (last visited
Oct. 3, 2018) (emphasis added).
46. About, WASH. U. L.: THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/about.php (last
visited Oct. 3, 2018), (emphasis added).
47. This rule does not strictly hold true, however, as some of the Legacy data, in particular,
contains as separate records quite minor actions such as modifications of previous decisions, where the
early decision and the modification are printed sequentially in the reporter without a break.
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not find any matches at all, we again marked the record for manual
investigation. Out of 28,827 records in SCDB, we immediately matched
23,262 cases in CAP (80.69%). Another 385 SCDB references matched
multiple CAP records, and 5,180 cases did not find a successful automatic
match.4 8
We then embarked on the second stage: correcting the data by hand to
yield the maximum number of possible matches. First, a close look at the
match data showed almost no matches at all after volume 567 of U.S.
Reports, which ended midway through calendar year 2012, and contains
up to the full 2011 term of the Court. From that point forward, the CAP
data was largely missing, and what data existed showed internal metadata
problems that suggested it should not be considered reliable.49 As a result,
we stopped our analysis after the 2011 Court term (which went through
spring of 2012). This process removed 477 of the unsuccessful matches,
leaving about 5,000 problematic entries.50 We corrected these by hand,
triangulating between the CAP metadata nd full text, the SCDB data, and
page images of the published U.S. Reports volumes available individually
from the Law Library of Congress. We noted that the bulk of the
corrections involved misleading or improperly converted nominal
reporter citations. There were also a couple of missing volumes among
the CAP data, one of which was found intact filed in another jurisdictional
grouping.51 Other mismatches were caused by reference typos. Still other
missing entries stemmed from CAP and SCDB not dividing the data in
the same way or failing to notice a transition to a new case. These latter
issues were essentially impossible to resolve, but often involved only very
minor court actions. Hand correction of the data took three weeks and was
revisited after each update of CAP data. While not every SCDB entry
could be matched to its CAP full text equivalent, we ended up matching
all but 191 SCDB cases, for an overall success rate of 99.33%.2
48. Reflecting SCDB Legacy 05 and 2019 release 01, with CAP, United States jurisdiction, rev.
20200303.
49. An additional, anticipated, problem with the recent cases was that U.S. Reports citations lag
publication of opinions in the Supreme Court Reporter, meaning that cases might have been included in
the datasets before they were issued a U.S. Reports reference. However, the initial automatic matching
took this into account, attempting to match SCDB's "sctCite" field if the U.S. Reports citation matching
failed. Even with this technique, very few cases were successfully matched up beyond the 2011 court
term.
50. 5,088, to be precise, with 385 of those being multiple-match hits.
51. 3 Howard or 44 U.S. Reports was inadvertently filed with the New York jurisdiction, and
remains there as of rev. 20200302, but our tools are designed to incorporate these cases. Many thanks to
Jack Cushman for pointing us to its hiding place. Jcushman, Comment to US Reports (US Supreme Court)
vol. 44 missing #801, GITHuB (Feb. 27, 2019), https://github.com/harvard-lil/capstone/issues/801.
52. 191 unmatched, out of 28,304 SCDB cases up to and including the 2011 term. Of these, 108
are from a missing "catchall" volume in the 19th century (U.S. Reports vol. 131), leaving only 83
unmatched cases scattered throughout the rest of the data. An examination of each of those, in turn,
suggests that many are minor case actions not distinguished by CAP but separated by SCDB, thus creating
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We then applied this SCDB connection information to our search
results, which narrowed our findings to the U.S. Supreme Court, and gave
us a way to connect our results to other metadata from the SCDB as
desired. Simultaneously, this weeded out minor and spurious cases,
duplicates, and results from other courts.53 Finally, connecting this data
to the SCDB also gave us a clear baseline against which we could
normalize our yearly results.
In all, searching across more than 28,000 full text U.S. Supreme Court
cases from 1791 to 2011, we found 79,693 individual matches of the word
"our" contained in 20,552 distinct opinions from 15,091 cases.54 More
than one-third of all cases (5270, 3 4 .9 2 %) had just a single use of "our."
The maximum number of "our" hits came in the opinion of Furman v.
Georgia, a case decided on a 5-4 vote in 1972, which had 157 detected
uses.55 Table 1, showing the top twenty cases with the greatest number of
uses of the word "our," features a number of instantly recognizable cases.
Further, a number of other well-known cases also feature substantial use
of the term: West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, Miranda v. Arizona, and
District of Columbia v. Heller all fall within the top 1% of opinions using
"our."5 6
Table 1: Top 20 heaviest uses of "our" in published U.S. Supreme
Court opinions, through 2011 term
U.S.
Case "Our" Uses Opinions Year CAP id SCDB id
Reports
Furman v. 408 U.S. 157 10 1972 1782791 1971-170
a mismatch. The corrected data is available from: Eric C. Nystrom & David S. Tanenhaus, Connecting
U.S. Supreme Court Case Information and Opinion Authorship (SCDB) to Full Case Text Data (CAP),
1791-2011 ZENODO (Dec. 18, 2020), https://zenodo.org/record/4344917.
53. Unlike CourtListener, CAP has relatively few duplicate cases, but since they provide the U.S.
Supreme Court data intermixed with other federal court jurisdictions, weeding out other courts becomes
important. CAP provides two fields which can be used for this purpose, but here are at least a handful of
errors, and even so, weeding in this fashion would leave the minor cases (e.g. per curiam) intact in the
dataset, which is not desired here.
54. This and other statistics to immediately follow derived from data file "CURRENT-our-kwic-
cap-scdb_05202020.tsv" available from Nystrom & Tanenhaus, Usages of 'our' by U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, 1791-2011, supra note 23.
55. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Although the decision was only a one-page per
curiam opinion about whether the imposition of the death in three specific cases violated the 8th and 14th
Amendments, there were more than 200-page of concurrences and dissents about the constitutionality of
death penalty more generally. The justices used the word "our" repeatedly in their dissents and
concurrences but the Court did not use the word in the per curiam opinion. For more about the case, see
DAVID M. OSHINKSY, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ON TRIAL: FURMAN V. GEORGIA AND THE DEATH PENALTY
IN MODERN AMERICA (2010).
56. All cases with 43 or more uses of "our" fall among the top 150 results (1%).
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Generally, however, the average number of uses of "our" was
modest-the median was 2, with a mean of 5.28, indicating a handful of
cases with large numbers of uses skewed the average. Detected uses, like
the data itself, spanned more than two centuries, from 1792 through the
2011 Supreme Court term, which ended in 2012. The most cases per
decade using "our" appeared in the 1980s (1442), followed closely by the
1970s (1338). The single highest year was 1976 (157), followed by 1984
and 1973 (155). Eighteen of the top twenty-one years with the most cases
were in the 1970s and 1980s.57 Moreover, while the usage of "our" clearly
varied, and was less common in the earliest years of the Court than later,
there is a remarkable consistency to the term's usage over time. Our search
revealed only four years in the span from 1792 to mid-2012 which did not
have a single published case using "our," and those four all occurred more
than two centuries ago.58
That the Supreme Court's workload of cases has varied substantially
over the course of its long existence is well known. In the Court's earliest
years, the limited scale and scope of the emerging nation's economy
helped keep the number of cases to a modest level, at least when
57. The exceptions are the year of 1884 (132 cases, 17th place), and 1990 and 1894, both of which
are tied for 19th place, along with 1978, with 130 cases each. It should be noted that this figure would be
susceptible to skewing as a result of an increased or decreased court workload.
58. These were 1794, 1797, 1802, and 1811.
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compared with later Court workloads. Judicial reform efforts in 1891 and
1925 attempted to streamline justice by creating the circuit courts of
appeals and further limiting cases the Supreme Court was required to
hear, permitting the justices greater latitude to select cases with
precedential value.59 Efforts by the justices to avoid thorny political issues
also shaped the Court's caseload over time.60 Therefore, a count of cases
using the term "our" might fruitfully be compared with the total number
of cases considered by the Court. As the line in Figure 1 below suggests,
in the earliest years of the Court, "our" usage could vary substantially
from year to year, depending on the issues at hand, even though the total
number of such cases was commensurate to the Court's small workload.6 1
The percent of cases using the term continued to vary dramatically
through the first half of the 19th century, peaking during times of
constitutional distress around 1850. From the late 1860s to the 1920s, the
Court underwent hree cycles of increasing usage followed by declining
usage, though never so high nor so low as during the antebellum era. From
1925, "our" usage climbed steadily to a peak in the mid-to-late 1940s.
Every year 1944-1950 inclusive saw more than 70% of opinions use the
term, with only 1946 missing the benchmark by less than 3/10ths of a
percent, and a peak in 1949 of more than 79% of cases using the term at
least once-the highest rate of usage since 1853. Though this high-water
mark stood for more than two decades (until bested by 1971's 81.6% use),
the rate of usage of the term remained high through the mid-20th century.
In 1973, the figure topped 82% again, and did not fall below 80% through
the end of our data (2011 Court term), with peaks of over 97% in 1999,
and 94% or above in 1989, 1991, 2000, and 2009.62
59. DAVID C. FREDERICK, RUGGED JUSTICE: THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
AMERICAN WEST, 1891-1941, at 16-17, 218-219 (1994); see also Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, The
Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925, 42 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1928) (cited in FREDERICK, supra,
at 219).
60. See LISA KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD
CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW (2001).
61. The bars in Figure 1 represent the count of cases using "our" in each year, among those cases
listed in the SCDB.
62. This analysis is based on data in the file "our-casecount-by-year_normalized.tsv" which is
derived from the CAP data connected to SCDB data mentioned above, normalized against casecounts by
year from SCDB. Eric C. Nystrom & Tanenhaus, Usages of 'our' by U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 1791-
2011, supra note 23. Intriguingly, though the data for this paper stops after the 2011 court term ends in
2012, CourtListener data suggests that there may be a significant drop in usage in 2012 and 2013. Though
the data from CAP used for this paper cannot shed light on this question, and CourtListener data must be
treated with caution until manually verified, this possible dip in usage may warrant further attention.
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Figure 1: Number and Percent of Supreme Court cases using "our"
at least once, by year
Percent of substantive Supreme Court cases using "our," by year
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the universe of our data to those cases that have an SCDB ID. By doing
so, we open doors to other types of analysis through the examination of
some of the many additional variables provided by the SCDB data, as
discussed in the following Sections of this Article.
While a glimpse at the number of cases using "our" in their opinions
shows that this number varied from the 19th century through the 20th
century, we might also examine the number of times any particular Court
opinion uses the term. Does this follow the trend of the number of cases,
or suggest a different pattern? Figure 2 below shows the average uses of
"our" per case, computed per year. In the early years of the republic, the
average uses per year were frequently high due to a small number of cases
using the term intensely. For example, 1793's average of 31 uses is
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attributable to a single case, Chisholm v. Georgia,63 as is 1800's average
of 18 (Bas v. Tingy64) and 1801's score of 13 (Talbot v. Seeman65). Even
so, this suggests the importance of the "our" language in at least a few
early cases. The years 1847 and 1849 show an average of more than ten
uses per case with 10 and 20 cases featuring the term at least once. Across
the 20th century, the average number of uses per case steadily crept up
over time, despite the much larger number of cases that use it at least once.
The figure reached an average of more than 13 uses per case in 1989,
across the 141 opinions with that term that year. The recent pattern of
intensive usage continues through the end of our study, with 19 of the
final 24 years averaging over 10 uses per case.66 Some used the term far
more. For example, National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius67 used "our" a whopping 94 times across four opinions, and
Perry v. New Hampshire68 used it 65 times over three opinions. Even in
an era where use of "our" by justices in their opinions is common, those
two cases stand out as intense users of the concept.
Figure 2: Average "our" uses per case, by year








1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050
63. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
64. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800).
65. Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801).
66. From 1989-2012 inclusive, excepting 1998, 1999, 2002, 2009, and 2011.
67. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
68. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012).
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II. PATTERNS OF "OUR" USAGE
Distinguishing cases using "our" from those not doing so, and tracking
the numbers of uses, gave us a broad overview of the use of this changing
term in the previous Section. The next step in the analysis was to attribute
those uses to particular justices. To do this, we correlated each case's
opinions, as presented in CAP, to SCDB's "justice-centered" dataset,
matching each opinion to its author (or, rarely, authors). Though this data
required some hand-correction, and about one percent of entries have
some kind of recognizable but unfixable problem, making this connection
allows us to utilize metadata from the SCDB to delve further into the
context of the use of this term by the Justices. In this Section, we look at
the "our"-using cases through several lenses: the changing configuration
of the Court, the apparent proclivities of individual Justices, topic areas,
voting majorities, and its use in concurrences and dissents.
Scholars well recognize the division of the Supreme Court's history
into eras marked by who served as Chief Justice. Do particular Chief
Justices impact the patterns of using "our" in opinions? Broadly speaking,
any analysis of Court eras by Chief Justice should be consistent with the
chronological patterns hown in the graphs in Section I, since there can
be no more than one Chief Justice at a time. One must also note that voting
coalitions within the Court can change over the long arc of a Chiefs
career; for example, as occurred with the Rehnquist Court.
Table 2: Uses of "our" per case, and cases using "our" at least once,
and "our"-using cases as percent of all cases heard during Chief
Justice term
Chief intensity ("ours" per "our" cases all frequency 
(% of intensity frequency
case) cases cases) rate rate
Jay 10.4 5 14 35.7143 heavy light
Rutledge 11.25 4 5 80 heavy heavy
Ellsworth 4.33333 6 41 14.6341 moderate light
Marshall 3.89807 363 1277 28.426 moderate light
Taney 3.61304 721 1653 43.6177 moderate moderate
Chase 2.29184 490 1312 37.3476 light light
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Waite 2.29001 1531 3549 43.1389 light moderate
Fuller 2.4982 2220 4963 44.731 light moderate
White 2.03565 1038 2547 40.7538 light moderate
Taft 2.1848 579 1616 35.8292 light light
Hughes 2.58974 858 1894 45.301 moderate moderate
Stone 4.85462 509 781 65.1729 moderate moderate
Vinson 5.94876 605 812 74.5074 moderate heavy
Warren 5.65379 1424 2205 64.5805 moderate moderate
Burger 7.70883 2356 2805 83.9929 heavy heavy
Rehnquist 11.5029 1869 2044 91.4384 heavy heavy
Roberts 11.6823 513 571 89.8424 heavy heavy
Table 2 examines the average number of uses of "our" per case
(intensity) and the number of cases using the term at least once
(frequency), grouped together by the term of each Chief Justice. The
number of cases using "our" is also expressed as a percentage of all cases
heard during each Chiefs tenure. We further characterized the frequency
and intensity of use as "light" (among the lowest quartile of values),
"heavy" (among the highest quartile of values), or "moderate" (in
between). This information suggests that the approach toward "our"
language may very well have varied significantly depending on which
justice was chief. It seems especially noteworthy that both the average
uses per case and the percent of cases using the term jumped dramatically
during the term of Harlan F. Stone as Chief Justice (July 1941 to April
1946). This spike in "our" usage correlates with Cass Sunstein's finding
that the Court's institutional culture of consensus broke down during
Stone's tenure. As a result, the Court began issuing more 5-4 decisions
that included many concurring and dissenting opinions.69
What if we look at the "our" usage of individual justices? Did some
individual writers prefer the term, or use the kind of reasoning that lent
itself readily to using "our"? It seems reasonable that this could be true.
We used a combination of automatic matching and manual correction to
connect each full-text Court opinion in the CAP data to the authoring
69. Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV.
769 (2015), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol100/iss4/2
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justice.70 Considering simply the number of opinions attributed to
particular justices, the justice with the most opinions including at least
one use of "our" was John Paul Stevens with 1058, followed by William
J. Brennan with 856, William O. Douglas with 792 and William H.
Rehnquist with 707. To a degree this is not surprising, as each of these
justices spent at least thirty years on the Court and would have had ample
opportunity to compile a large number of "our"-using cases.
A better comparison might be to see what percentage of the opinions
written by each justice featured "our" at least once. If we remove justices
who published fewer than 100 opinions during their tenure on the Court
included in our dataset (through the 2011 term),71 then the average (mean)
justice used "our" at least once in slightly more than half of their
published opinions.72 Justices using the term more than one standard
deviation above and below the mean are shown in Table 3 below, with
the heaviest and lightest users of the term, with a percentage usage more
than 1.5 standard deviations above or below the mean, respectively,
demarcated by a heavy line.
Table 3: Percentage of opinions with "our", 1 standard deviation
above/below the mean, with heavy line marking 1.5 standard deviations
above/below
Justice "Our" opinions Total Opinions Percentage
AMKennedy 397 471 84.2887
WHRehnquist 707 876 80.7078
AScalia 614 771 79.6368
EWarren 183 235 77.8723
SDOConnor 498 640 77.8125
DHSouter 260 347 74.928
WJBrennan 856 1145 74.7598
70. We also count co-authored opinions once for each writer.
71. Justices who did not meet this standard in our dataset, which ends after the 2011 court term,
are: GDuvall, SChase, JWilson, TTodd, RTrimble, OEllsworth, BWashington, HBLivingston,
WPaterson, SThompson, CEWhittaker, WCushing, JMcKinley, WHMoody, HEJackson, JFByrnes,
HBaldwin, BRCurtis, PPBarbour, AFortas, AJGoldberg, SSotomayor, LWoodbury, FMVinson,
JGRoberts, EKagan, and JIredell.
72. N = 82, and if the percentage of usage is analyzed, the mean is 50.36 and standard deviation
17.5.
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CThomas 342 461 74.1866
LFPowell 436 598 72.9097
RBGinsburg 254 351 72.3647
TMarshall 565 782 72.2506
SFReed 251 352 71.3068
SAAlito 83 117 70.9402
JPStevens 1058 1495 70.7692
RHJackson 210 303 69.3069
FFrankfurter 454 658 68.997
SNelson 107 332 32.2289
DDavis 66 205 32.1951
CEHughesl 46 155 29.6774
NClifford 137 473 28.9641
LDBrandeis 151 523 28.8719
JMcLean 80 280 28.5714
percuriam 587 2118 27.7148
WHunt 41 155 26.4516
RBTaney 75 286 26.2238
SBlatchford 109 427 25.5269
ETSanford 35 138 25.3623
HGray 114 457 24.9453
SPChase 41 197 20.8122
JMarshall 99 539 18.3673
JRLamar 7 121 5.78512
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the top users of "our" all served during the
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high-water mark of "our" usage in the late 20th century.73 More
intriguingly, two of the five top users were chief justices, and two of the
three justices with the lowest usage rates were also chief justices. In the
case of John Marshall and Salmon P. Chase, since they presided over the
Court when many more relatively routine cases were heard, we might
surmise that the chief justice ended up writing on behalf of the court
frequently in relatively unimportant cases, which would lower the average
use.
Does the picture change if we examine the number of uses of the term,
rather than just its presence or absence in any particular case? In Table 4
below, we see the average number of "our" uses in each opinion
containing at least one use of the term, grouped by the justice who wrote
the opinion. Table 4 displays only those justices whose overall intensity
of uses (that is, "ours" per opinion) is more than one standard deviation
above or below the mean. Many of the most intense "our" users are from
the recent era, which is not surprising given the overall intensity of use of
this term since the 1970s. Perhaps most unexpected is the appearance of
Justice James M. Wayne, who served from 1835 to 1867. This table, like
Table 3 above, only contains justices who had written 100 or more
opinions in our dataset (by the end of the 2011 term). Recently-added
justices Elena Kagan (10.8333 per opinion), John Roberts (9.6338), Sonia
Sotomayor (7.64286), and Samuel Alito (6.50602) would have also made
this list had they had sufficient opinions to make the cutoff. Among light
users, we find no justice that served after 1941, but the list includes two
chief justices and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Table 4: Intensity of "our" uses per opinion, +/- 1 standard dev
(1.5363) above/below mean (3.4687)
Justice "Our" Uses Total Opinions Avg. "our" Per Opinion
AMKennedy 3170 397 7.98489
AScalia 4061 614 6.61401
SDOConnor 3283 498 6.59237
JPStevens 6771 1058 6.39981
JMWayne 654 105 6.22857
CThomas 2075 342 6.06725
73. In an example of the sorts of unusual patterns that also emerge when examining extremely
small sample sizes, four of these five top users were Westerners. (Rehnquist, the most dubious Westerner
of the four, went to Stanford and was in private practice in Phoenix for sixteen years.)
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DHSouter 1531 260 5.88846
WJBrennan 4776 856 5.57944
WHRehnquist 3871 707 5.47525
RHJackson 1133 210 5.39524
EWarren 924 183 5.04918
MWFuller 702 368 1.90761
MRWaite 705 370 1.90541
NClifford 257 137 1.87591
WRDay 371 201 1.84577
JCMcReynolds 355 199 1.78392
OWHolmes 502 321 1.56386
Further, we might imagine that the rhetorical position of the justice
writing the opinion could have some impact on the use of "our" language.
Using CAP's characterization of the stance of each opinion, we can see in
Table 5 below that the presence or absence of "our" and the intensity of
the usage of the term within a particular opinion, if present, varied
depending on the type of opinion being written. Concurrences were the
least likely form of opinion to use the term at least once, where dissents
were most likely to see "our" invoked by the writer. For those opinions
using the word, majority opinions had the fewest average uses per
opinion, while opinions characterized as "concurring in part and
dissenting in part" used the term most intensely.
Table 5: "Our" usage by type of opinion (common types)
Intensity
Total Frequency
Type "Our" Opinions (avg per Total Opinions Frequ")
Uses (%o "our")
opinion)
concurrence 7149 1817 3.93451 3882 46.8058
majority 53528 14536 3.68244 28121 51.6909
concurring-in-part-
and-dissenting-in- 2305 477 4.83229 833 57.2629
part
dissent 18564 3906 4.75269 6684 58.4381
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The judicial proclivities, rank and position, personal writing style, and
relationship to the majority coalition of individual justices clearly might
impact the use of "our" in opinions. But what about more structural
questions, such as the area of the law or the particular legal issue? The
SCDB has helpfully categorized each case in its dataset by both area and
legal issue.74 A breakdown of the "our"-using opinions and comparison
with the SCDB universe as a whole suggests that some areas of the law
were much more likely to see "our" language employed by the justices.
As seen in Table 6 below, more than 80% of all SCDB cases categorized
as "First Amendment" cases used "our" in the opinion at least once.
Privacy cases similarly used "our" 79% of the time, and 73% of cases
about unions used "our" language as well. By contrast, other areas of the
law saw much less usage of the "our" language in opinions. Many fewer
private action cases did so, for example, and rates for interstate relations,
federal taxation, and economic activity cases were likewise low. Perhaps
surprisingly, the category of cases about judicial power was the third-
lowest rate, which seems striking given the presumed opportunity of such
cases for reflection upon practice, which might lend itself to using "our"
language.
Table 6: Legal issue area of cases
Issue Area "Our" Cases SCDB Cases "Our" as % of Total
First Amendment 639 797 80.1757
Privacy 107 135 79.2593
Unions 390 528 73.8636
Criminal Procedure 2129 3125 68.128
Federalism 571 889 64.2295
Civil Rights 1709 2686 63.6262
74. Specifically, the project uses a general and a detailed breakdown for each. These are
"issueArea," "issue," "lawtype," and "lawsupp" respectively. The SCDB documentation makes clear the
judgement that went into constructing these variables, noting particularly that sometimes fitting early
court actions into a framework of categories that were developed to describe activity since World War II
is sometimes a challenge, but the database creators are guided by the idea of attempting to understand
what kind of case today's court would consider each historic opinion. See WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW, Issue, The Online Code Book, THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE,
http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=issue (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
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Miscellaneous 70 111 63.0631
Due Process 631 1130 55.8407
Economic Activity 4234 8357 50.6641
Attorneys 161 333 48.3483
Interstate Relations 127 268 47.3881
Judicial Power 2386 5535 43.1075
Fed. Taxation 632 1485 42.5589
Private Action 1305 3332 39.1657
Uncategorized 0 116 0
If the SCDB's "issueArea" variable can help us analyze the areas
impacted by the Court's decisions, as seen above in Table 6, the database's
"LawType" category can similarly permit us to study the relative
distribution of "our"-using opinions among different legal questions, as
seen in Table 7 below. This variable, according to the SCDB, describes
"the constitutional provision(s), statute(s), or court rule(s) that the Court
considered in the case."75 Though this is a broad picture, it is similarly
suggestive that "our" language appears much more frequently in some
kinds of cases than in others. Those considering constitutional
amendments and federal statutes seem to have reached for "our" fairly
frequently. By contrast, those considering state laws and regulations did
so only rarely.
Table 7: Legal Provision(s) considered by the Court
"Our" as % of
Law Type "Our" Cases SCDB Cases
Total
Const. Amendment 2341 2984 78.4517
Fed. Statute 2727 3966 68.7595
75. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW, Legal Provisions Considered by the Court, Online
Codebook, SUPREME COURT DATABASE:, http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=lawType (last
visited Oct. 7, 2018) (describing lawType" variable). This was derived by SCDB from the "Summary"
of the reported case in the Lawyers' Edition reporters. SCDB variables "lawSupp" and "lawMinor" express
similar information with a more fine-grained categorization, which could be useful for further
investigation of particular types of provisions. SCDB provides a number of caveats about the accuracy of
this data for pre-1946 cases, see id.
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Constitution 751 1133 66.2842
Court Rules 295 487 60.5749
Other 378 656 57.622
Infrequent Litigate (Code) 2724 5234 52.0443
(uncategorized) 644 1333 48.3121
State, local law or reg. 1034 2267 45.6109
No Legal Provision 4197 10767 38.9802
If the use of "our" in an opinion carries any meaning, as the authors of
this study presume that it does, it might be logical to think that the
language is deployed more in some circumstances more than others. Table
8, below, categorizes "our"-using cases specifically as well as all cases in
the SCDB dataset by the number of minority votes the case received when
considered by the Court.76
Table 8: Votes in Minority position
Minority Votes "Our" Cases SCDB Cases "Our" as % of Total
0 8668 20225 42.8578
1 1448 2202 65.7584
2 1676 2246 74.6215
3 1862 2314 80.4667
4 1437 1840 78.0978
An examination of Table 8 seems to suggest a clear pattern: that "our"
appears more frequently as the number of votes in the minority rises. Most
of the work of the Court has been accomplished in unanimous decisions,
with nearly ten times the number of unanimous decisions as any other
type of voting pattern among the cases recorded in the SCDB data.
However, 42% of those cases used the word "our" at least once. At the
other end of the spectrum, cases that had four votes in the minority
76. We used minority vote only (SCDB variable "minVote") rather than a vote pattern containing
votes for and against (e.g. 9-0, 5-4) because there were sufficient variations on the latter, due to recusals,
empty seats, and changes in the number of seats on the Court over time that the table would have been
unduly lengthy.
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representing a 5-4 vote and a deeply divided court-saw "our" language
used more than 78% of the time. Those with three minority votes used
"our" 80% of the time, which is the highest rate, perhaps suggesting a
Court substantially divided, yet without such starkly drawn battle lines.
Whether used to invoke the Court's own precedent or argue for
consideration of timeless values held by all Americans, the necessity for
this kind of work-aimed perhaps at other justices, perhaps at the public,
or both-clearly rose as the Court's voting coalitions narrowed.
III. CATEGORIZING CONTEXTUAL MARKER WORDS
To this point, our analysis of the use of "our" by Supreme Courtjustices
has largely relied on very simple measurements of the opinion language:
does the word "our" exist in the text of the opinion(s), and if so, how many
times is it used? But "our" is a slippery word, and its slipperiness is one
element of the appeal of attempting to measure its use. In an opinion,
"our" can mean very different things. When the Court says "there is no
doubt of our jurisdiction upon certiorari," 77 or points a reader to "the
principles declared in our former decision,"78 they are using the term in a
Court-centered, self-aware linguistic mode that highlights the Court's
judicial process.79
"Our" is used in a second way that differs markedly from this first. As
highlighted in the Introduction of this Article, the Court also chooses
"our" in situations that call, in the eyes of the opinion author, for the
claiming or construction of American culture or values as a guide to court
action. For example, in the flag-salute case of West Virginia v. Barnette
(1943), Justice Jackson pointed out, "The case is made difficult not
because the principles of its decision are obscure, but because the flag
involved is our own."80 He added, "Nevertheless, we apply the limitations
of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and
spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social
organization. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic
ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous, instead of a compulsory
routine, is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our
institutions to free minds."81 These usages of "our" set the stage for his
famous proclamation: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
77. B. Fernandez & Bros. v. Ayllon Y Ojeda, 266 U.S. 144, 146 (1924) (emphasis added).
78. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 385 (1926) (emphasis added).
79. Our description of the procedural usage of our is similar to David A. Straus's argument about
the Supreme Court's common-law approach to constitutional interpretation. The justices are consciously
thinking about their decisions as part of a longstanding tradition. DAVID A. STRAUS, THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION (2010).
80. West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (emphasis added).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
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constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion,
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are
any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to
us." 2 "Our" can help contrast American ideals and traditions versus
foreign ideals and traditions, refer to the American body politic, and even
build a judicial heritage. We saw examples of this usage in Justice
Murphy's dissent in Korematsu.
To get at these questions, we built software tools to extract words
before and after each usage of "our" in every opinion in our dataset, to
show us the keyword "our" in its context. Initially, we focused on those
words immediately following each "our" use. These were extracted into
a spreadsheet and grouped by the number of uses. From the 79,693 uses
of "our" found in Supreme Court opinions, we noted 6,599 distinct terms
following "our." 83 Then, much as in the apocryphal story of the famous
sculptor who simply chiseled away all the marble that did not look like
his statue,84 our expert legal historian simply deleted all the words that
were not "process" words when following "our" in this context. He then
repeated this procedure, using a fresh spreadsheet, to save words that
indicated "heritage" when following "our." 85 In this first effort,
concentrating on the most common words, we mapped 391 terms with 25
uses or more, representing almost 79% of the uses of "our" that we
found.86
This initial effort suggested the fruitful potential of this technique but
exposed some weaknesses. The largest problem was that the word
following "our" was not always the word that actually represented the
heritage or process meaning. For example, "our basic approach" was
recognizably a statement about process, where "our basic freedoms" was
clearly about heritage, yet the word to categorize, in this first technique,
would have been simply "basic."
Our second try, with rebuilt tools, relied on grammatical structures to
help us identify the important terms. "Our" is a possessive pronoun, and
82. Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
83. Numbers based on CURRENT-our-kwic-cap-scdb_05202020.tsv (May 20, 2020), available
from Nystrom & Tanenhaus, Usages of 'our' by U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 1791-2011, supra note 23.
For a full discussion of our technique, see David S. Tanenhaus & Eric C. Nystrom, What's Ours?:
Qualitative Classification of Culture and Process in U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Language, 1793-2011
(data paper manuscript under preparation).
84. You Just Chip Away Everything that Doesn't Look Like David, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (June
22, 2014), https://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/06/22/chip-away/.
85. As our thinking evolved thanks to repeated exposure to the case texts, we eventually settled
on "culture" as a more accurate descriptor than "heritage."
86. 62,926 uses. The top word was "decision," with 4871 uses. Numbers based on CURRENT-
our-kwic-cap-scdb_05202020.tsv (May 20, 2020), available from Nystrom & Tanenhaus, Usages of 'our'
by U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 1791-2011, supra note 23.
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the noun it possesses follows "our" in a sentence. The original technique
faltered when the noun possessed was actually a noun phrase, which is a
series of adjectives modifying a noun. Using this insight, we fed each
"our" hit and its context into an open-source tool which probabilistically
determined and tagged the part of speech of each word.87 With the part-
of-speech information, we could computationally begin at each "our" hit,
move through adjectives and other words (saving as we went), until
encountering the noun that completed each noun phrase. Using noun
phrases, instead of just the next word after "our," allowed us to be much
more specific about assigning meaning to particular uses. It also expanded
the field of terms (really, phrases) to classify by almost a third, to 9,527
unique nouns and noun phrases.88
We employed a multilayered approach to classify the terms as
extensively as possible. Over several rounds, our legal historian used his
judgment to determine each term's meaning. We first classified the most
common terms and term phrases using the manual technique described
before. Among the most common terms, if a word was not assigned to
either the process or heritage categories, it was automatically labeled
"uncategorized" and set aside for further processing.
Next, we used three methods to computationally assist further
classification of less-common terms. First, to address examples where a
phrase, which had not yet been categorized, contained a noun that had
already been determined, we took the noun out of the noun phrase and
compared it to our classified hits. If, for example, "our constitution" was
labeled a culture use, the rarer phrase "our glorious constitution" could
then also be provisionally dubbed culture. Second, we repeated this
technique, but examined only the root of the noun in the noun phrase.
Here, we could extrapolate that because "our government" was a culture
marker use which we had classified manually, the rarer form "our
governments" should also be labeled culture. Third, we used measures of
similarity to find very close matches between existing labeled words and
uncategorized terms. These measures sometimes corrected artifacts from
the typesetting and OCR process. For example, "our certiorari" was a
process use, so we could guess that "our certio-rari" just one letter
different-was essentially the same thing. These computerized guesses
were all reviewed by our legal historian for accuracy, and any rejected
guesses returned to the uncategorized pile.
We then reviewed the "uncategorized" terms from before, which
87. We used the Perl Lingua::EN::Tagger library, v0.28. Aaron Coburn, Lingua-EN-Tagger-0.28,
METACPAN (Dec. 23, 2016), https://metacpan.org/pod/Lingua::EN::Tagger.
88. Statistics computed from CURRENT-our-pos-cap-scdb_05202020.tsv and RESULTS-our-
kwic-followers-opinauth-chief_071520.tsv (May 20, 2020), available from Nystrom &Tanenhaus,
Usages of 'our' by U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 1791-2011, supra note 23.
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seemed to have multiple meanings in some cases. For these words, our
legal historian wanted to see each use in the context of its use, not just as
a bare word. For each uncategorized term with five or more uses, we
gathered the whole context of each specific use, and every individual use
was classified as culture, process, or indistinct. Eventually, more than
5,800 uses were classified; though this work took much less time per term
than classifying individual words, since the context was so helpful in
seeing the term's particular use. These uses were then aggregated by term.
If 80% or more of the uses were either "culture" or "process" uses, then
the term was agreed to have that meaning. If the classifications revealed
a more evenly-mixed rate of usage, the term was dubbed "ambiguous."
We then applied these categorizations, in a final round of application and
checking, via the computational methods described above to the
remaining uncategorized uses.
As a result, in addition to process-oriented uses and culture-
constituting uses, our data suggests that "our" occasionally appeared in
three additional modes. One of these, which we termed "indistinct,"
featured words that were simply too difficult to accurately place as either
cultural or process terms. This included uses such as "in the year of our
lord," and others where the meaning was not clearly part of either
tradition, such as "our statute," "our clients," or "our invention." We also
noted that a small number of terms might hold distinct cultural or process
meanings in specific instances, but that not all uses of the term reliably
shared those meanings. Those terms whose meaning could shift between
culture and process in the examples we examined were labeled
"ambiguous."
Finally, we had a last category containing "uncategorized" terms, for
which we did not attempt to determine a meaning. These were terms
which appeared no more than four times across the corpus of opinions
(indeed, more than three-quarters of them appeared only once), and did
not bear close enough relationship to an existing classified term to be able
to be categorized that way. Due to their rarity and low proportion of the
universe of "our" uses, we initially decided that any terms remaining
unclassified after the efforts described above were not worth further
efforts to classify. During the manual review, we also identified two
terms, used once each, where OCR had inadvertently created what
appeared to be an "our" phrase by breaking apart some non-"our" word.
These were classified as OCR errors.
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Table 9: Nouns following "our" in Supreme Court opinions, classified
by type
Classification Unique Terms % of Terms Uses % of Uses
process 5025 52.7448 54865 68.8454
culture 2566 26.934 18856 23.6608
indistinct 1638 17.1932 3328 4.17603
ambiguous 246 2.58213 2576 3.2324
uncategorized 50 0.524824 66 0.0828178
ocrerror 2 0.020993 2 0.00250963
Total 9527 79693
Upon further reflection, however, we decided to have our legal
historian double check all the 9,527 usages, which included classifying
the remaining "uncategorized" terms. This final stage of classification
required reading the relevant sections of hundreds of opinions. Immersing
ourselves in the Court's language from different eras helped us to
understand more precisely the justices' linguistic choices.89 For example,
we discovered that "our pen" is a process usage because it refers to the
court's metaphorical pen, whereas "our pencil" was indistinct because it
referred to somebody else, not the justices, trying to use a pencil as a
deadly weapon.90 It also helped us to see instances where the Court
included quotations with the word "our" embedded in them. Many of
these usages fell into the indistinct category because they referred to
neither American culture generally, nor to the Court itself.
We also learned that justices have used variations on time (e.g., first,
recent, frequent, immediate, longstanding, and last), imaginary creations
(e.g., family, statute, and observer), and location (e.g., standpoint or
starting-point) to discuss the judicial process. Their cultural markers
included formative events ("our revolution"), geography ("our shores"),
foreign relations ("our treaties"), institutions ("our federal system"), and
haunting images such as Justice Scalia lamenting "our half-born
89. The finalized data is available from David S. Tanenhaus & Eric C. Nystrom, Classification of
Culture and Process in U.S. Supreme Court Language, 1793-2011 ZENODO (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://zenodo.org/record/4743988. For the importance of historians immersing themselves in the past,
see William J. Novak, Constitutional Theology: The Revival of Whig History in American Public Law,
2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 623 (2010).
90. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 423-24 (2010); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961).
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posterity."91
IV. TALKING ABOUT CULTURE
We might reasonably guess that the types of "our" uses-whether
culture-framing, process-oriented, or otherwise-might vary over time.
As Figures 4 and 5 below suggest, based on our categorization, the
percentage of "our" cases in which the Supreme Court used the word in a
potentially culturally constitutive manner began strong in the few cases
heard in the court during the Early Republic period, extending into the
1820s. The Court's usage began swinging back and forth between a
predominance of process language and a predominance of cultural
language during the antebellum era. After 1856, the predominance of
process-oriented uses of "our" slowly and unevenly outpaced the culture-
constituting uses of the term, until by 1915-a process-using spike
slightly more than 75% of all uses were process ones. From there, the use
of culture-invoking "our" terms increased as a proportion of use. The
years around World War II and its immediate aftermath showed a surge
in cultural uses. In both 1950 and 1952, the justices' proportion of cultural
language exceeded the process language for the first time in nearly a
century. Since then, even as use of "our" language became more common,
the percentage of that language that was process-oriented increased as the
century wore on. Even though the proportions of cultural and process uses
have not been equal since mid-century, particular years show different
patterns of usage.
91. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Figure 4: Culture Process Indistinct Ambiguous uses of "our,"
each year as percentage of yearly uses
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uses, by year
Trends like cultural and process uses over time are comprised of
individual case texts, and an examination of some of these opinions might
be fruitful. In addition to finding historical periods of intense cultural
usage, we also analyzed the Top 20 heaviest uses of "our" cases to see
how the justices deployed the word in these cases. This is shown in Table
10 below. As a starting point, we might examine the culture / process /
uncategorized / indistinct / ambiguous "our"-usage for the same cases as
we saw in the beginning of this paper-that is, those whose text used
"our" the most.
Table 10: Top 20 heaviest "our" using cases, by type of usage
"Our"
SCDB
































City of 091 124 48.39 41.13 5.65 4.84
Chicago
American 1989- 112 0.89 99.11 0 0
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Holder v. Hall 101 10.89 84.16 0.99 3.96
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Smith v. 1849-
100 73 20 5 1
Turner 018
School District 1962-
96 60.42 31.25 0 8.33
v. Schempp 148
United States 1994-
96 34.38 59.38 3.12 2.08
v. Lopez 051
The top three cases-Furman, Citizens United, and Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Company-are all landmark decisions that sharply divided the
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justices. Furman (1972) and Youngstown (1952), which were decided
during periods of spiking cultural use, stand out for their especially high
percentages of cultural usages (54% and 81%, respectively); whereas
Citizens United (2010) used cultural markers (27%) much less than
process language (65%). Accordingly, a closer look at Furman and
Youngstown may reveal how the justices used "our" as a cultural marker
during periods of high usage. We also need to consider whether cases with
especially high percentages of cultural usage (say, more than 40%), such
as Smith v. Turner (73%), Furman (54%), Youngstown (81%) and
Korematsu (62%), are qualitatively different in meaningful ways from
cases with lower percentages such as Citizens United (26%) or Planned
Parenthood v. Casey (27%)?92 If so, is there a potential canon of culture-
constituting cases?93
The following analysis of Furman is illuminating because it reveals
how all nine justices in one decision used the word "our" to make their
arguments about who "we" are and how "they" should opine. For each
use, we have indicated how this "our"-phrase was classified based on the
following word: cultural uses are marked "C", process uses are marked
"P", and any ambiguous, indistinct, or uncategorized uses are marked
accordingly. Even though Furman, the longest decision in the Court's
history, is sui generis, it does hold clues to understanding whether there
is a larger universe of culture-constituting cases worth studying
collectively as a significant phenomenon or making into a canon of
constitutional law.
The Court's one-page per curiam opinion in Furman did not use "our,"
but all the concurrences and dissents did (157 total usages). The first
concurrence by Justice William O. Douglas used "our" to explain where
the language of the Eighth Amendment comes from and to reinforce his
conclusion that the death penalty has been administered unfairly.94 To
make the point that the death penalty is unfairly administered, he
explained, "One searches our chronicles [C] in vain for the execution of
any member of the affluent strata of this society. The Leopolds and Loebs
are given prison terms, not sentenced to death."95 His final use of "our"
92. As Martha Jones notes in Birthright Citizens, Congress ordered 10,000 copies of the Court's
decision in Smith v. Turner (1849) to be printed in pamphlet form. MARTHA JONES, BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENS
200 n.5 (2018). As our data reveals, Smith v. Turner, more commonly known as "the Passenger Cases,"
was the heaviest "our" user case before 1951. See also Alfred L. Brophy, Louisa McCord and Antebellum
Southern Legal Thought, 5 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 33 (1998).
93. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 963 (1998). The relationship between law and the uses of history is an animating theme of Robert
Gordon's scholarship. See ROBERT W. GORDON, TAMING THE PAST: ESSAYS ON LAW IN HISTORY AND
HISTORY IN LAW (2017).
94. There is a large literature on capital punishment. See, e.g., STUART BANNER, THE DEATH
PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2002).
95. Furman v. Georgia., 408 U.S. 238, 251-52 (1972) (emphasis added).
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connected his understanding of history and practice to the procedural
matter of how the court should make its decision in the present cases. He
concluded:
We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these defendants
were sentenced to death because they were black. Yet our task [P] is not
restricted to an effort to divine what motives impelled these death penalties.
Rather, we deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the
uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether
defendants committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned. Under
these laws, no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or
die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12.96
As the first opinion in the case, Douglas's concurrence previewed the
use of "our" in Furman to constitute culture ("our chronicles") and to
discuss judicial decision-making ("our task"). His brethren responded in
kind and volume.
The next opinion, Justice William Brennan's long concurrence, is a
tour de force of "our" usage. In the first three parts of his opinion,
Brennan uses "our" to frame his overarching argument about the Court's
responsibility to serve as a check against unconstitutional forms of
punishment. In Part I of the opinion, he introduces "our" as a cultural
marker, followed by a procedural use of a different form of the word
embedded in a citation to an earlier decision, Trop v. Dulles:
The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, like the other great clauses of
the Constitution, is not susceptible of precise definition. Yet we know that
the values and ideals it embodies are basic to our scheme [C] of
government. And we know also that the Clause imposes upon this Court
the duty, when the issue is properly presented, to determine the
constitutional validity of a challenged punishment, whatever that
punishment may be. In these cases, "[t]hat issue confronts us, and the task
of resolving it is inescapably ours."97
In Part II of the opinion, he uses "our" to argue for applying the theory
of evolving standards of decency to determine the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. Using "our"
allowed Brennan to emphasize the agency of the justices because it was
their duty, unlike the light cavalry in Lord Tennyson's poem, to ask why.
"Our task [P] today is more complex. We know 'that the words of the
[Clause] are not precise, and that their scope is not static.' We know,
96. Id. at 253 (emphasis added). Douglas's footnotes also included usages of "our" that were
similar his usage of the term in the text itself. See, e.g., id. at 247 n.10.
97. Id. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring). Note that "ours" is uncategorized in this case because our
software looked only for the word "our" and excluded any variations. Different techniques would have
been necessary to find the noun phrase modified by different grammatical constructions. "Task," the noun
possessed by "ours," is categorized as a process word in our data.
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therefore, that the Clause 'must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' 98
In Part III of the opinion, Brennan used "our" to situate the death
penalty at the beginning of the nation's history and at the heart of its moral
conflicts. In the following passage, note the rhetorical power of "our" at
the beginning of the first paragraph and the rhetorical impact of its rapid
repetition near the end of the second paragraph:
From the beginning of our Nation [C], the punishment of death has stirred
acute public controversy. Although pragmatic arguments for and against
the punishment have been frequently advanced, this longstanding and
heated controversy cannot be explained solely as the result of differences
over the practical wisdom of a particular government policy. At bottom,
the battle has been waged on moral grounds. The country has debated
whether a society for which the dignity of the individual is the supreme
value can, without a fundamental inconsistency, follow the practice of
deliberately putting some of its members to death. In the United States, as
in other nations of the western world, the struggle about this punishment
has been one between ancient and deeply rooted beliefs in retribution,
atonement or vengeance, on the one hand, and, on the other, beliefs in the
personal value and dignity of the common man that were born of the
democratic movement of the eighteenth century, as well as beliefs in the
scientific approach to an understanding of the motive forces of human
conduct, which are the result of the growth of the sciences of behavior
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
It is this essentially moral conflict that forms the backdrop for the past
changes in, and the present operation of, our system [C] of imposing death
as a punishment for crime. Our practice [P] of punishing criminals by
death has changed greatly over the years. One significant change has been
in our methods [A] of inflicting death. Although this country never
embraced the more violent and repulsive methods employed in England,
we did for a long time rely almost exclusively upon the gallows and the
firing squad. Since the development of the supposedly more humane
methods of electrocution late in the 19th century and lethal gas in the 20th,
however, hanging and shooting have virtually ceased. Our concern [P] for
decency and human dignity, moreover, has compelled changes in the
circumstances surrounding the execution itself. No longer does our society
[C] countenance the spectacle of public executions, once thought desirable
as a deterrent to criminal behavior by others. Today we reject public
executions as debasing and brutalizing to us all.99
Searching for the word "our" and culture-constituting usage got us to
Furman. A close reading of the case reveals that Justice Brennan's use of
98. Id. at 269-70 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 365 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)) (emphasis added).
99. Id. (emphasis added).
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"ours," "we," and "us all" are variations on "our" that our distant reading
techniques would not have picked up, but which added rhetorical power
to the justice's opinion. 100
Like Justice Brennan, Justice Thurgood Marshall's long concurrence
in Furman called for the abolition of the death penalty and used "our" in
similar culturally constitutive ways. Part I of Marshall's opinion includes
direct statements and quotations from primary sources to make a
historical argument about tradition: "our religion" (A),101 "our founding"
(C) fathers,10 2 "our Bill [C] of Rights,"103 and "our ancestors" (C)104 .
Marshall's Part II analysis of the case law, however, used "our" only once
to remind his brethren of "our knowledge" (P) about the scope of the
language in the Eighth Amendment.
In Part III of his opinion, Marshall then used "our" to contend that "a
penalty that was permissible at one time in our Nation's [C] history is not
necessarily permissible today,"105 and that when "[f]aced with an open
question, we must establish our standards [P] for decision"106. He then
chronicled "our history" (C) of capital punishment and abolitionist
movements in Part IV, 10 7 and "our criminal jurisprudence"1 08 (P) and
"our jurisprudence"109 (P) in his Part V. Justice Marshall then argued that
the Eighth Amendment is a check on human nature. "At times, a cry is
heard that morality requires vengeance to evidence society's abhorrence
of the act. But the Eighth Amendment is our insulation [A] from our
baser [C] selves. The 'cruel and unusual' language limits the avenues
through which vengeance can be channeled. Were this not so, the
language would be empty, and a return to the rack and other tortures
would be possible in a given case."110
After establishing that the Court could act, Marshall presented
mounting evidence that the death penalty did not have a deterrent effect
on "crime in our society""' (C) and that these findings required the justice
to assert themselves. As he explained, "We would shirk our judicial
responsibilities [P] if we failed to accept the presently existing statistics
100. For an introduction to the concept of "distant reading," see MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE & DANIEL
N. ROCKMORE, LAW As DATA 3-19 (2019).
101. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 318 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 319.
103. Id. at 320.
104. Id. at 321.
105. Id. at 329.
106. Id. at 330.
107. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 333-41 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 342.
109. Id. at 343.
110. Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 353.
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and demanded more proof"11 2 He could not accept that "at this stage in
our history, [C] the American people would ever knowingly support
purposeless vengeance"13 and the justices had to know that "the death
penalty wreaks havoc with our entire criminal justice system"11 4 (C).
Marshall's opinion concluded with a crescendo of heritage-constituting
ours:
At a time in our history [C] when the streets of the Nation's cities inspire
fear and despair, rather than pride and hope, it is difficult to maintain
objectivity and concern for our fellow [C] citizens. But the measure of a
country's greatness i its ability to retain compassion in time of crisis. No
nation in the recorded history of man has a greater tradition of revering
justice and fair treatment for all its citizens in times of turmoil, confusion,
and tension than ours. This is a country which stands tallest in troubled
times, a country that clings to fundamental principles, cherishes its
constitutional heritage, and rejects imple solutions that compromise the
values that lie at the roots of our democratic system [C].
In striking down capital punishment, this Court does not malign our system
[C] of government. On the contrary, it pays homage to it. Only in a free
society could right triumph in difficult times, and could civilization record
its magnificent advancement. In recognizing the humanity of our fellow
[C] beings, we pay ourselves the highest tribute. We achieve "a major
milestone in the long road up from barbarism" and join the approximately
70 other jurisdictions in the world which celebrate their regard for
civilization and humanity by shunning capital punishment.
I concur in the judgments of the Court." 5
Among the five concurrences, Brennan's and Marshall's stand out as
potential ideal types of a cultural genre in American constitutional law.
But perhaps their opinions were only the last vestiges of the long 1960s
revolution in constitutional law? 16 To answer that question, of course, we
would have to examine cases from other eras, such as Youngstown, which
were decided during different historical periods.
Before turning to Youngstown, we need to examine the four dissenting
opinions in Furman. Chief Justice Burger wrote the first dissent, which
Justices Harry Blackmun, Lewis Powell, and William Rehnquist joined.
Justice Blackmun wrote a dissent to express his personal thoughts, which
no other justice joined. Justice Powell wrote a separate dissent that
Burger, Blackmun, and Rehnquist joined. Finally, Rehnquist wrote a
112. Id.
113. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 371 (emphasis added).
116. RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE
MAKING OF THE 1960S (2016).
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dissent that all the dissenters joined. Collectively, the four dissents used
"our" as part of their arguments about judicial self-restraint. They used
both cultural and process usages to do so. For example, after stressing that
only Brennan and Marshall believed that the death penalty was
unconstitutional "for all crimes and under all circumstances,"1 1 7 Burger
repeatedly used "our" to advocate for "our traditional deference [P] to the
legislative judgment."1 18 As he explained at the outset:
If we were possessed of legislative power, I would either join with MR.
JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL or, at the very
least, restrict the use of capital punishment to a small category of the most
heinous crimes. Our constitutional inquiry [P], however, must be divorced
from personal feelings as to the morality and efficacy of the death penalty,
and be confined to the meaning and applicability of the uncertain language
of the Eighth Amendment. There is no novelty in being called upon to
interpret a constitutional provision that is less than self-defining, but, of all
our fundamental guarantees [C], the ban on "cruel and unusual
punishments" is one of the most difficult to translate into judicially
manageable terms. The widely divergent views of the Amendment
expressed in today's opinions reveal the haze that surrounds this
constitutional command. Yet it is essential to our role [P] as a court that
we not seize upon the enigmatic character of the guarantee as an invitation
to enact our personal predilections [P] into law. 119
Burger's process-inflected usage included emphasizing the critical role
that jurors played in death penalty cases. He noted, "It seems remarkable
to me that with our basic trust [P] in lay jurors as the keystone in our
system [C] of criminal justice, it should now be suggested that we take the
most sensitive and important of all decisions away from them."12 0
Blackmun, like Burger, emphasized that courts were not legislators. As
he noted:
Our task [P] here, as must so frequently be emphasized and re-emphasized,
is to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation that has been enacted and
that is challenged. This is the sole task for judges. We should not allow our
personal preferences [P] as to the wisdom of legislative and congressional
action, or our distaste [P] for such action, to guide our judicial decision [P]
in cases such as these. The temptations to cross that policy line are very
great. In fact, as today's decision reveals, they are almost irresistible.121
Justice Blackmun ended with a cautionary note to his fellow justices to
remember the victims of crime and to hope that the Court's decision to
117. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 375 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 385.
119. Id. at 375-76 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 402.
121. Furman, 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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suspend the death penalty would do no harm. He concluded:
[T]hese cases are here because offenses to innocent victims were
perpetrated. This fact, and the terror that occasioned it, and the fear that
stalks the streets of many of our cities [C] today perhaps deserve not to be
entirely overlooked. Let us hope that, with the Court's decision, the terror
imposed will be forgotten by those upon whom it was visited, and that our
society [C] will reap the hoped-for benefits of magnanimity.1 22
He added, "Although personally I may rejoice at the Court's result, I
find it difficult to accept or to justify as a matter of history, of law, or of
constitutional pronouncement. I fear the Court has overstepped. It has
sought and has achieved an end."12 3
Justice Powell's dissent incorporated "our" into a procedural argument
for judicial self-restraint. Powell also used "our" to separate the present
from the past. In response to concerns about racial injustice, he stated:
A final comment on the racial discrimination problem seems appropriate.
The possibility of racial bias in the trial and sentencing process has
diminished in recent years. The segregation of our society [C] in decades
past, which contributed substantially to the severity of punishment for
interracial crimes, is now no longer prevalent in this country. Likewise, the
day is past when juries do not represent the minority group elements of the
community. The assurance of fair trials for all citizens is greater today than
at any previous time in our history [C]. Because standards of criminal
justice have "evolved" in a manner favorable to the accused,
discriminatory imposition of capital punishment is far less likely today than
in the past.4
This juxtaposition of "society" and "history" reveals a subtle cultural
usage of "our" that requires a close reading to appreciate how it divorces
present concerns about justice from past unjust practices.
The final dissenting opinion, authored by William Rehnquist, began
with a clear heritage assertion: "The Court's judgments today strike down
a penalty that our Nation's [C] legislators have thought necessary since
our country [C] was founded."12 5 Rehnquist included quotations from
case law that included "our," but did not use the word again in his opinion
that ended with a plea for "judicial self-restraint" as an implied part of the
power of judicial review." 126 In this instance, his use of culture reads like
a direct response to the culture-laden concurrences of Brennan and
Marshall.
Furman, as we acknowledge, may be an outlier of a decision because
122. Id. at 414.
123. Id.
124. Furman, 408 U.S. at 450 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
125. Furman, 408 U.S. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 470.
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of the combination of a short per curiam opinion, followed by every
justice contributing his own take on the case. In addition, the case was
also decided at a particularly turbulent time in the Court's history.12 7
For these reasons, we conclude this Section with a brief analysis of
Youngstown (commonly referred as the Steel Seizure Case), the decision
that declared President Truman's Executive Order 10340
unconstitutional. On April 8, 1952, President Truman directed Secretary
of Commerce Charles Sawyer to take over the operations of the nation's
steel mills temporarily to help resolve a labor dispute that threatened to
disrupt production while the nation was fighting the undeclared Korean
War. Truman's order repeatedly used "our" to justify his actions: "our
national security," "our responsibilities," "our armed forces," "our
defense efforts," "our military strength," "our national defense," and "our
soldiers."128 On April 29, federal district court judge David A. Pine
granted a preliminary injunction, but his order was stayed until the
Supreme Court could review the case. The justices granted review, heard
oral arguments on May 12, and issued their 6-3 decision on June 2.129
Youngstown shares several similarities with Furman, including its
more than 40% usage of "our" as a cultural marker. Indeed, Youngstown's
uses were over 81% of the culture-constituting type. The case also
includes seven opinions, which helps to account for its 130 total uses of
"our." William O. Douglas, the longest serving justice in the Court's
history, also contributed short concurrences in both cases that used
cultural markers.130 The major differences include the subject matters and
that Youngstown included very few process-oriented usages of "our"
(only 13% of the total).
Justice Black, who eight years earlier had authored the majority
opinion in Korematsu that upheld President Roosevelt's executive order
during wartime, once again wrote for the majority of the Court. He
sprinkled "our" throughout his opinion including several heritage
markers: "our national defense"131 (C), "our constitutional system"132 (C),
"our Constitution,"133 (C) and "our economy"134 (C). After these culture
127. For an introduction to the literature about the Burger Court, see L.A. Powe, Jr., (Re)Evaluating
the Burger Court, 52 TULSA L. REv. 587 (2017).
128. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589-91 (1952).
129. MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER (1977).
130. In Youngstown, for example, Douglas stated: "But our history and tradition rebel at the
thought that the grant of military power carries with it authority over civilian affairs." 343 U.S. at 632
(Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
131. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583(emphasis added).
132. Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 588 (emphasis added).
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uses, he concluded the opinion with a process usage that connected the
nation's founding to the Court's current decision:
The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the
Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall
the historical events, the fears of power, and the hopes for freedom that lay
behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our holding [P] that
this seizure order cannot stand.1 35
Black had used an argument about "our constitutional system" to
explain why the justices had to exercise their power to strike down the
president's executive order. His opinion established the bright-line model
for understanding separation of powers that clearly distinguishes between
legislative lawmaking and executive law-enforcing powers.
Justices Felix Frankfurter's and Robert Jackson's concurrences
contributed to the significance of Youngstown because they laid out two
competing models for how courts and scholars have conceptualized
separation of powers. But how did Frankfurter and Jackson respectively
use "our" to support their competing approaches to this core constitutional
problem?
Like Brennan's concurrence in Furman, Frankfurter's concurrence in
Youngstown is chock-full of heritage language, both those classified by
our technique as cultural markers and others only obvious with additional
words of context. He included Truman's entire executive order in his
opinion and immediately afterwards launched into a discussion of "our"
heritage. The following paragraphs outlined his understanding of
separation of powers but also rehashed his argument about the limits of
what courts could and should do:
Before the cares of the White House were his own, President Harding is
reported to have said that government, after all, is a very simple thing. He
must have said that, if he said it, as a fleeting inhabitant of fairyland. The
opposite is the truth. A constitutional democracy like ours is perhaps the
most difficult of man's social arrangements to manage successfully. Our
scheme [C] of society is more dependent than any other form of
government on knowledge and wisdom and self-discipline for the
achievement of its aims. For our democracy [C] implies the reign of reason
on the most extensive scale. The Founders of this Nation were not imbued
with the modern cynicism that the only thing that history teaches is that it
teaches nothing. They acted on the conviction that the experience of man
sheds a good deal of light on his nature. It sheds a good deal of light not
merely on the need for effective power if a society is to be at once cohesive
and civilized, but also on the need for limitations on the power of governors
over the governed.
135. Id. at 589 (emphasis added).
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To that end, they rested the structure of our central government [C] on the
system of checks and balances. For them, the doctrine of separation of
powers was not mere theory; it was a felt necessity. Not so long ago, it was
fashionable to find our system [C] of checks and balances obstructive to
effective government. It was easy to ridicule that system as outmoded-
too easy. The experience through which the world has passed in our own
day [C] has made vivid the realization that he Framers of our Constitution
[C] were not inexperienced doctrinaires. These long-headed statesmen had
no illusion that our people [C] enjoyed biological or psychological or
sociological immunities from the hazards of concentrated power. It is
absurd to see a dictator in a representative product of the sturdy democratic
traditions of the Mississippi Valley.
The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come,
however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the
restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority.
The Framers, however, did not make the judiciary the overseer of our
government [C]. 136
Frankfurter's use of "our" allowed him to discuss what was distinctive
about American constitutionalism, while using "our own day" to remind
his readers of WWII and the rise of totalitarian forms of government and
the wisdom of "the Framers of our Constitution." He then cautioned about
the dangers of judicial supremacy to "our government." Ultimately,
Frankfurter's opinion argued for a more pragmatic approach to questions
about separation of powers than Black's bright-line approach.
Frankfurter, however, had used cultural markers to frame his subsequent
analysis.
Although Justice Jackson also used cultural markers, the beginning of
his opinion questions whether quoting from such sources makes
constitutional sense in the modern world. As he explained:
The tendency is strong to emphasize transient results upon policies-such
as wages or stabilization-and lose sight of enduring consequences upon
the balanced power structure of our Republic [C].
A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the poverty of really
useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of
executive power as they actually present themselves. Just what our
forefathers [C] did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen
modern conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as
the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and
a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result, but
only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each
136. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593-94 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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side of any question. They largely cancel ach other. And court decisions
are indecisive because of the judicial practice of dealing with the largest
questions in the most narrow way.
The actual art of governing under our Constitution [C] does not, and
cannot, conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches
based on isolated clauses, or even single Articles torn from context.13 7
Much like the legal realist critique that one can cite precedent for either
side of a legal question, Jackson made a similar argument about cultural
markers as "more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each
side of any question." Instead, Jackson provided a three-part model for
the kinds of separation-of-powers issue that presidential action could
trigger. He did, however, use history, both early and modern, to
emphasize that presidential power was not unlimited. This included his
assertion:
[I]f we seek instruction from our own times [C], we can match it only from
the executive powers in those governments we disparagingly describe as
totalitarian. I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all
conceivable executive power, but regard it as an allocation to the
presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated.138
Although Jackson questioned the use of cultural markers at the
beginning of his opinion, it closed with a discussion of the "essence of
our free Government [C] is 'leave to live by no man's leave, underneath
the law'-to be governed by those impersonal forces which we call law.
Our Government [C] is fashioned to fulfill this concept so far as humanly
possible." "Such institutions," he concluded, "may be destined to pass
away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them
up." 139 This conclusion sounded similar to his argument in West Virginia
v. Barnette that there is a "fixed star in our constitutional constellation
[C]. "140
Black's, Frankfurter's, and Jackson's opinions in Youngstown all relied
on the word "our" to frame their arguments about why the president's
order could not stand. Their collective reliance on cultural markers
suggest that they lived and wrote during an era of acute historical
consciousness. In this regard, Youngstown is similar to Furman. In
Furman, the justices acknowledged concerns about violent crime
threatening social order, while also trying to come to terms with the
nation's history of racial injustice and the arbitrary application of the
137. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 641 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 655.
140. West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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death penalty.
A close reading of these two cases suggests that our digital exploration
of the word "our" is partly a tour of exceptionally long landmark cases.
But further exploration may help us to rediscover forgotten cases and to
understand the ebb and flow of the court's diction from John Marshall's
time to our own. For example, we still do not know why during the
Warren Court years and ever since process-oriented "our" usage has
steadily eclipsed cultural usage.
V. CONCLUSION
Our digital exploration of the Supreme Court's use of the word "our"
has revealed patterns of usage that changed over time, provided aggregate
analysis of how the justices have used the word to make arguments about
culture and process, and enhanced a close reading of two landmark
decisions. These findings help to answer some of our initial questions
about the representativeness of the language from World War II-era
decisions, such as Korematsu, that included the famous dissents of
Justices Jackson and Murphy. We now know that the 1940s and 1950s
were, indeed, a period when cultural usages spiked and briefly exceeded
process-oriented usages of the word "our." The close reading of cases
such as Furman and Youngstown also helped us to think about how to
refine our tools to address the problem of high rates of initially
uncategorized "our" usage, and how cultural rhetoric, in particular, could
be mobilized in both concurring and dissenting opinions, albeit toward
different ends. These close readings also revealed that specific usages of
terms such as "our practice" confirm that our classification system can
help scholars see larger usage patterns over time and to isolate cases
meriting closer inspection. Such distant reading complements but does
not replace the parsing of texts.
Although our data analysis concluded with the 2011 term of the
Supreme Court, we have been struck by how Justice Sonia Sotomayor has
used the word "our" in some of her memorable dissents since then. This
includes her efforts to expand whose voices are featured in constitutional
discourse and how the justices should remember their Korematsu
decision. For example, in Utah v. Streiff (2016), a case about an unlawful
police stop in Salt Lake City, Sotomayor explained:
Writing only for myself, and drawing on my professional experiences, I
would add that unlawful "stops" have severe consequences much greater
than the inconvenience suggested by the name. This Court has given
officers an array of instruments to probe and examine you. When we
condone officers' use of these devices without adequate cause, we give
them reason to target pedestrians in an arbitrary manner. We also risk
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treating members of our communities [C] as second-class citizens.14 1
As her dissent made clear, "our communities" include those
communities of color who have had historically tense relationships with
the police.14 2
Significantly, she omitted the word "our" in her subsequent description
of those who have been disproportionately affected by policing. For
example, note how she used "their" instead of "our" in the following
passage:
This case involves a suspicionless top, one in which the officer initiated
this chain of events without justification. As the Justice Department notes,
supra, at 8, many innocent people are subjected to the humiliations of these
unconstitutional searches. The white defendant in this case shows that
anyone's dignity can be violated in this manner. See M. Gottschalk, Caught
119-138 (2015). But it is no secret hat people of color are disproportionate
victims of this type of scrutiny. See M. Alexander, The New Jim Crow 95-
136 (2010). For generations, black and brown parents have given their
children "the talk"-instructing them never to run down the street; always
keep your hands where they can be seen; do not even think of talking back
to a stranger-all out of fear of how an officer with a gun will react to them.
See, e.g., W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (1903); J. Baldwin,
The Fire Next Time (1963); T. Coates, Between the World and Me
(2015).143
She then invoked W.E.B. DuBois's famous idea of "double
consciousness" from The Souls of Black Folk to set up her explanation of
the powerful message that unrestrained policing sends:
By legitimizing the conduct that produces this double consciousness, this
case tells everyone, white and black, guilty and innocent, that an officer
can verify your legal status at any time. It says that your body is subject to
invasion while courts excuse the violation of your rights. It implies that
you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a carceral state, just
waiting to be cataloged.14
In this passage, she connected the experiences of whites and blacks to
make a general point about the erosion of constitutional rights and
citizenship in a carceral state. In this framing, everyone becomes a subject
instead of a citizen.
In her conclusion, Justice Sotomayor used "our" to drive home her
141. 579 U.S. __, 9-10 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
142. For a synthesis of the historical literature on race and policing, see Elizabeth Hinton & DeAnza
Cook, The Mass Criminalization of Black Americans: A Historical Overview, 4 ANN. REV CRIMINOLOGY.
(forthcoming 2021), available at https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-criminol-
060520-033306.
143. Streiff, 579 U.S.__ at 11-12 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 12 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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point that "we" all need to listen to the voices of those who have had to
give "the talk" to "their children":
We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted
by police are "isolated." They are the canaries in the coal mine whose
deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere.
See L. Guinier & G. Torres, The Miner's Canary 274-283 (2002). They
are the ones who recognize that unlawful police stops corrode all our civil
liberties [C] and threaten all our lives [C]. Until their voices matter too, our
justice system [C] will continue to be anything but.145
As the mass protests in the summer of 2020 in the wake of George
Floyd's murder have shown the world, Justice Sotomayor's dissent was a
prescient warning about the dangers of Americans thinking too narrowly
about whose lives mattered. 146
And, as Justice Sotomayor reminded her fellow justices two years later
in Trump v. Hawaii, they needed to reconsider the Court's role in
Korematsu, as well as today. "In the intervening years since Korematsu,
our Nation [C] has done much to leave its sordid legacy behind," she
explained.14 7 And, as she pointed out, "Today, the Court takes the
important step of finally overruling Korematsu, denouncing it as 'gravely
wrong the day it was decided.' 148 She added, "This formal repudiation of
a shameful precedent is laudable and long overdue... But it does not make
the majority's decision here acceptable or right," she explained. "By
blindly accepting the Government's misguided invitation to sanction a
discriminatory policy motivated by animosity toward a disfavored group,
all in the name of a superficial claim of national security, the Court
redeploys the same dangerous logic underlying Korematsu and merely
replaces one 'gravely wrong' decision with another."14 9 Her short
conclusion included three powerful "our" usages:
"Our Constitution [C] demands, and our country [C] deserves, a Judiciary
willing to hold the coordinate branches to account when they defy our most
sacred legal commitments [C]. Because the Court's decision today has
failed in that respect, with profound regret, I dissent."150
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. On May 27, 2020, historian Ariela Gross explained why Floyd's murder should be considered
a lynching: "Lynching is defined by historians as a murder committed in public, by three or more
perpetrators, for the purpose of "administering justice" or punishing an alleged crime without trial. This
was a lynching, pure and simple." Ariela Gross (@arielagross), TWITTER (May 27. 2020, 8:11AM),
https://twitter.com/arielagross/status/1265661856389009409.
147. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2448 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
148. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting)).
149. Id..
150. Id. (emphasis added).
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Perhaps future justices will draw on Justice Sotomayor's language to
engage our history in order to fulfill their most sacred commitments.
